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I. INTRODUCTION
The seemingly simple question of, “what is a vessel?” has a very complex
answer. In the context of United States admiralty law, the definition of the word
“vessel” has different meanings depending upon which statute has jurisdiction, the
nature of the circumstances, and the characteristics of the person involved. There is
no settled definition of the word. As a result, the character of ships and vessels can
hardly be denied to almost any structure, including steam-ships,2 motor driven tugs,3
canal boats drawn by animal power,4 jet skis,5 a floating elevator,6 and a houseboat.7
1
Mr. Nemerofsky is currently pursuing an L.L.M. in Tax at the University of Florida. He
is a Certified Public Accountant and holds a B.S. (Accounting), University of Maryland;
M.B.A. (Information Systems Technology), George Washington University; J.D., Whittier
Law School.
2

See The Devonshire, 13 F. 39 (C.C.D. Or. 1882) (arguing that the British steam-ship
Devonshire was a vessel under the Act of March 3, 1855).
3

See Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (including motor driven tugs
as vessels for purposes of inspection and regulation).
4
See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903) (holding that canal boats drawn by
animal power on the Erie Canal were vessels).
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Conversely, sometimes structures that are commonly thought of as vessels are
denied such status under the law.8 For instance, if one is suing their employer for
injuries suffered on a barge, the claim may be denied,9 regardless of how gruesome
the wounds, if the barge is determined not to be a “vessel.”
The Jones Act is a statute designed to cover seamen injured by the negligent acts
of their employer, and is indicative of other admiralty statutes which, by their lack of
a specific definition of the word “vessel,”10 have created controversy in the judicial
system. An analysis of a Jones Act “vessel,” therefore, is a good vehicle by which
one can examine this issue in greater depth. In the analysis of a Jones Act vessel, an
inquiry into a Jones Act seaman is a necessary first step.
This comment proposes a three prong test that suggests several criteria to be used
by the trier of fact for determining whether something meets the definition of a
“vessel.” The objective is to provide a tool that can be used in a variety of situations
involving different admiralty statutes in an effort to produce a more consistent
understanding.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
Courts considering the question of whether a particular structure is a vessel
typically find the term “is not capable of precise definition.”11 “Much as we would
like to formulate a definition of ‘vessel’ that captures the essence of the seagoing
definiendum, no platonic form suggests itself, hence we are left with the halting
efforts of the common law.”12
Even in more common usage, the word seems to take on different meanings.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary describes “vessel” as, “a watercraft or
5

See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a jet ski was
a vessel covered by the Limitation of Liability Act, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1479 (1936) (codified at
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994)).
6
See The Hezekiah Baldwin, 12 F. Cas. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 6,449) (holding that a
floating elevator used in New York harbor was a vessel subject to a maritime lien).
7

See Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that a powerless houseboat was a vessel capable of being subjected to a maritime lien).
8
See Garret v. Dean Shank Drilling Co., 799 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that an
injured worker was not entitled to recovery under the Jones Act because the barge upon which
he was working was not a vessel in navigation).
9

Id.

10

See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).

11

Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1984). In the case of
Offshore Co. v. Robison, Judge Wisdom noted, “[a]ttempts to fix unvarying meanings . . . to
such terms as ‘seaman’ [and] ‘vessel’. . . must come to grief on the facts.” 266 F.2d 769, 779
(5th Cir. 1959). “Even where the facts are largely undisputed, the question at issue is not
solely a question of law when, because of conflicting inferences that may lead to different
conclusions among reasonable men, a trial judge cannot state an unvarying rule of law that fits
the facts.” Id. at 780.
12

McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1983).
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structure with its equipment whether self-propelled or not that is used or capable of
being used as a means of transportation in navigation or commerce on water and that
usu[ally] excludes small rowboats and sailboats.”13 Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“vessel” as, “[a] ship, brig, sloop, or other craft used, or capable of being used, in
navigation on water.”14 Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines states on their ticket, “[t]he
word “Vessel” shall mean any ship, chartered, operated or provided by Royal
Caribbean Corp. on which the Passenger may be traveling or, as the case may be,
against which the Passenger may assert a claim.”15
Different cultures also characterize the word “ship” using their own set of
criteria. By the Roman law, “[n]avim accipere debemus sive marinam, sive
fluviatilem, sive in aliquo stagno naviget sive schedia sit. Dig. de Exercit Act,”16
which loosely translates as “includ[ing] everything which floated upon the waters
and was accessory to commerce.”17 “Under the [old] French law the definition is
almost equally as broad. Says Emerig. Assur. c[hapter] 4, [section] 7, par[agraph] 1:
The word ‘ship’ (navire) includes every vessel of timber workable to float and to be
carried upon the water.”18
B. Definitions Of “Vessel” Found In Other Admiralty Statutes
In United States maritime law, different statutes have also identified the term
“vessel” in various ways. Some statutes use the term “vessel” without defining it at
all, while others use specific terminology or nomenclature familiar in the field.19 As
scholars Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr. commented in their treatise, The
Law of Admiralty,
practically all of the business that comes before the admiralty court
directly or indirectly concerns what are indubitably ‘vessels.’ In the
dealings of the courts with the structures and objects that have raised the
question actively, a single clear test is hard to discern; perhaps the best
approximation would be to say that the term ‘vessel’ is applied to floating
structures capable of transporting something over the water.20
In the First Circuit case of DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc.,21 the court found at

13

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2547 (1976).

14

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1562 (6th ed. 1990).

15

Royal Caribbean Corp., “Contract for Carriage of Passengers,” 1989.

16

A Raft of Cypress Logs, 20 F. Cas. 169, 170 (W.D. Tenn. 1876) (No. 11,527).

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

See discussion infra pp. 4-7.

20
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 33 (2d ed. 1975)
(citing Pleason v. Gulfport Shipping Corp., 221 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1955)). However difficult
it may be to discern the word “vessel,” summary judgment is only appropriate if, “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
21

959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992).
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least twenty-four maritime or maritime related statutes with slightly different
wordings for the definition of “vessel.”22 Some examples include:
1. The Interstate Commerce Act- “[V]essel means a watercraft or other artificial
contrivance that is used, is capable of being used, or is intended to be used, as a
means of transportation by water.”23
2. Whaling Convention Act- “Vessel: The word ‘vessel’ denotes every kind,
type, or description of water craft or contrivance subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States used, or capable or being used, as a means of transportation.”24
3. The International Navigational Rules Act of 1977- “[V]essel means every
description of watercraft, including nondisplacement craft and seaplanes, used or
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.”25
4. The Anti-Gambling Act- “The term ‘vessel’ includes every kind of water and
aircraft or other contrivance used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water, or on water and in the air, as well as any ship, boat, barge, or
other watercraft or any structure capable of floating on the water.”26
22
Id. at 1129-30, (Torruella, J., dissenting). See also The Contraband Seizure Act, § 1(e),
108 Stat. 1353 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 80301(3) (1994)). “‘Vessel’ means a
contrivance used, or capable of being used, for transportation in water, but does not include
aircraft.” Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, tit. I, § 2, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 201(i) (1994)). “The term ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable or being used, as a means of transportation on water,
exclusive of aircraft and amphibious contrivances.”; The Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, tit. I, § 3, 48 Stat. 1065 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §153 (w)(1) (1994)). “‘[V]essel’ includes
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance, except aircraft, used or capable
of being used, as a means of transportation on water, whether or not it is actually afloat.”; The
Sentencing Reform Act, ch. 645, § 3615, 62 Stat. 840 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3667
(1994)). “As used in this section, ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft used, or
capable of being used as a means of transportation in water or in water and air.”; Neutrality
Act of 1939, ch. 2, § 16, 54 Stat. 12 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 456(c) (1994)). “The term
‘vessel’ means every description of watercraft and aircraft capable of being used as a means of
transportation on, under, or over water.”; The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, tit. I, § 1001, 104
Stat. 486 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) (1994)). “‘[V]essel’ means every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water, other than a public vessel.”; The Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance
Act, ch. 858, §§ 905(e),1101 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1271(b) (1994)). “The term
‘vessel’ includes all types, whether in existence or under construction, of passenger cargo and
combination passenger-cargo carrying vessels, tankers, tugs, towboats, barges, dredges and
ocean thermal energy conversion facilities or plant ships which are or will be documented
under the laws of the United States . . . .”; The Submarine Cable Act, ch. 17, § 10, 25 Stat. 42
(1888) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 30 (1994)). “[T]he term vessel shall be taken to mean every
description of vessel used in navigation, in whatever way it is propelled . . . .”
23

The Interstate Commerce Act, 92 Stat. 1338 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10102(30)
(1994)).
24

The Whaling Convention Act, ch. 653, § 2, 64 Stat. 421 (1950) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
916(e) (1994)).
25
The International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, § 2, 91 Stat. 308 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1601(1) (1994)).
26

The Anti-Gambling Act, ch. 139, § 23, 63 Stat. 92 (1949) (codified at U.S.C. § 1081
(1994)).
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III. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
A. Historical Perspective
1. History of the Jones Act
The Jones Act is indicative of other statutes in admiralty law that contain
nebulous definitions of the word “vessel.” For that reason, it will be helpful in
analyzing the Jones Act to gain a better perspective of the larger controversy.
In March 1915, Congress took the first step towards promoting the safety of
seamen in the merchant marines by passing the Act of March 4, 1915.27 The
complete name of the legislation was, “An Act to Promote the Welfare of American
Seaman in the Merchant Marine of the United States; to Abolish Arrest and
Imprisonment as a Penalty for Desertion and to Secure the Abrogation of Treaty
Provisions in Relation Thereto, and to Promote Safety at Sea.”28 The Act, which
took up approximately twenty pages in the Statutes at Large, was concerned mostly
with matters such as seamen’s working conditions and life-saving equipment.29 At
the very end, section 20 received little notice,30 but is the one section that contained
recovery for injuries suffered onboard a vessel.31
The Act included a definition of the word “vessel,” which was derived from
section 65 of the Act of June 7, 1872, which re-enacted the 1866 United States
Revised Statutes, section 4612.32 That definition read in part:
In the construction of this chapter, every person having the command of
any vessel belonging to any citizen of the United States shall be deemed
to be the ‘master’ thereof; and every person (apprentices excepted) who
shall be employed or engaged to serve in any capacity on board the same
shall be deemed and taken to be a ‘seamen’; and the term ‘vessel’ shall be
understood to comprehend every description of vessel navigating on any
sea or channel, lake or river to which the provision of this chapter may be
applicable . . . .33
Section 20 of the Act of March 4, 1915, was soon amended as part of the Act of
June 5, 1920, passed by the Sixty-Sixth Congress.34 The complete name of the 1920
27

Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, §§ 1-20, 38 Stat. 1164-85.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30
See H.R. REP. No. 1439, 63D CONG., 3d Sess. 25, 30 (1915), 52 CONG. REC. 4639, 4640
(1915) (noting how Congress treated section 20 of the Act of 1915 with little attention).
31

Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185.

32

Act of June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 277. The complete title of the Act was, “An Act to
Authorize the Appointment of Shipping Commissioners by the Several Circuit Courts of the
United States, to Superintend the Shipping and Discharge of Seaman Engaged in Merchant
Ships Belonging to the United States, and for the Further Protection of Seamen.” Id.
33

Id.

34

Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, §§ 1-39, 41 Stat. 988-1008 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§
861-889 (1994)).
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Act was “An Act to Provide for the Promotion and Maintenance of the American
Merchant Marine, to Repeal Certain Emergency Legislation, and Provide for the
Disposition, Regulation, and Use of Property Acquired Thereunder, and for Other
Purposes.”35 Section 39, in effect, stated that the entire 1920 Act “may be cited as
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.”36
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 included the Ship Mortgage Act,37 amended
the Maritime Lien Act of 1910,38 and established the United States Shipping Board.39
However, it was section 33, which appeared at the end of statute 1007 under the
subtitle of “Miscellaneous Provisions”40 that amended section 20 of the Act of 1915.
Section 33 was unrelated to the balance of the statute, and became more popularly
known as the Jones Act41 due to the efforts of Senator Wesley L. Jones of
Washington state who was Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee at the
time.42
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 included its own definition of the word
“vessel,” which was different than the one used in the Act of March 4, 1915. The
Merchant Marine Act borrowed its terminology from the Shipping Act of 1916.43
Section 37 of the Merchant Marine Act,44 under the title, “words and terms in act
defined,” read: “When used in this act unless the context otherwise requires, the
terms . . . vessel . . . shall have the meaning assigned . . . by sections 1 and 2 of the
Shipping Act, 1916, as amended by this Act.”
The definition of “vessel” found in the Shipping Act of 191645 read, “[a]ll
watercraft and other artificial contrivances of whatever description and at whatever
stage of construction, whether on the stocks or launched, which are used or are
capable of being or intended to be used as a means of transportation on water.”46
But, since “lawmakers amended section 20 of the Act of 1915 by substituting

35

Id.

36

Id.; § 39, 41 Stat. 1008 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 889 (1994)).

37

Id.; § 30, 41 Stat. 988, 1000-05 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-916 (1994)).

38

Id.; § 30, 41 Stat. 988, 1005-06 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 971-975
(1994)).
39

Id.; § 3, 41 Stat. 988, 989-990.

40

Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007.

41

Id. (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994)).

42

See 59 CONG. REC. 8170 (1920). It was introduced by Senator Jones on February 6,
1920 as the last section of S. Res. 3876, 66th CONG., 2d Sess. § 3 (1920), and was added by
the Senate Commerce Committee to H.R. 10,378, 66th CONG., 1st. Sess. (1919). S. Rep. No.
573, 66th CONG., 2d Sess. 23.
43
Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44, 39 Stat. 728, as amended by the Act of July
15, 1918, ch. 152, §1-4, 40 Stat. 900-903 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 801-842 (1994)).
44

Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 37.

45

Id.; § 44 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 842 (1994)). “This chapter may be cited as
‘Shipping Act, 1916.’” Id.
46

Id.
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section 33 of the [Merchant Marine] Act of 1920,”47 neither the definition of “vessel”
appearing in the Act of March 4, 1915, nor the definition contained in section 37 of
the Act of June 5, were found in Section 33 of the Act of June 5, 1920 (the Jones
Act).48 In fact, the Jones Act contained no definition of the word “vessel,”49 therein,
creating the problem.
2. First, There Must be a Seaman
As just discussed, the Jones Act does not reference the word vessel.50 It only
alludes to seamen. The Jones Act reads in part:
§ 688. Recovery for injury to or death of seaman
Any seamen who shall suffer injury in the course of his employment, may
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right to
trial by jury . . . and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any
such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury . . . .51
Predictably, claims by seamen injured in the course of their employment covers a
large number of all admiralty cases that come before the court. “A careful
examination of docket statistics in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana [from 1977-1986] indicates that approximately one-fourth of
the civil actions filed in that busy court . . . were ‘personal injury--Jones Act cases.”52
Prior to the Jones Act, there was no remedy in negligence for a seaman to sue his
employer,53 but “with the passage of the Jones Act . . . Congress secured for seaman
certain legal advantages when injured.”54 “As Justice Story explained, [since]
seaman ‘are emphatically the wards of the admiralty’ they ‘are by the peculiarity of
their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and
exhausting labour,’”55 and as such, should be provided benefits under the law.
It may be stating the obvious, but to be a seaman, one must have something to do
with the sea or water. Of course, a seaman does not actually have to work on the sea,
or be a man. A woman could make a Jones Act claim, and she could be employed
on a riverboat casino floating on the Mississippi River, miles from the nearest sea.56
47

Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 159 (1934).

48

Compare Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20 with Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, §§ 33 &

37.
49

Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33.

50

46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).

51

§ 688(a).

52

Peter Beer, Keeping Up With the Jones Act, 61 TUL L. REV. 379, 400 (1986) (compiling
based on a review by the author, Beer, of the Clerk’s Office Records).
53

Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co., 961 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1997).

54

Id.

55

Id. (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).

56

See generally Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir.
1995) (concerning recovery under the Jones Act for severe injuries to plaintiff’s knee, which
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“In a broad sense, a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon
the sea.”57 But, the presence of some type of “structure” is a necessary ingredient
since swimmers do not qualify under the Jones Act.58
Usually, in defining statutory terminology, “[t]he most persuasive evidence of . . .
[congressional] intent [are] the words selected by Congress.”59 But, Congress failed
to define the term seaman in the Jones Act.60 However, the Supreme Court in
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander61 stated that, “‘seamen’ is a maritime term
of art. In the absence of contrary indication, we assume that when a statute uses such
a term, Congress intended it to have its established meaning . . . under the general
maritime law when Congress passed the Jones Act.”62
Therefore, it must be determined how the term “seaman” was used in 1920, the
time the Jones Act was passed. The traditional definition of a seaman at that period
was one who could “hand-reef and steer.”63 In the 1916 case of The Buena
Ventura,64 Judge Hough pointed out “that every one is entitled to the privilege of a
seaman who, like seamen, at all times contribute to and labor about the operation and
welfare of the ship . . . .”65 And as one court later said, “The Jones Act . . . speaks
only of seaman, but courts have naturally spoken of seaman in terms of ships,
vessels, and voyages.66 So, in short, “For there to be a seaman, there must first be a
ship.”67
Therefore, a seaman must have some kind of relationship to a vessel or ship,
although the specific nature of that connection is outside the scope of this article.68
she claims occurred by tripping over a garbage can lid while working as a cocktail waitress
aboard a floating dockside casino).
57

Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934).

58

See Delta Country Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 986 F.2d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an action for injuries suffered by a fifteen year old boy, who dove off the deck of
a houseboat into the river and was rendered quadriplegic, bore no relationship to traditional
concepts of maritime activity). This was not a Jones Act claim, but there was no admiralty
jurisdiction anyway.
59
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Forsyth Energy, Inc., 666 F.2d
1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting the court’s function in interpreting a statute).
60

46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).

61

498 U.S. 337 (1991).

62

Id. at 342.

63

The Ole Oleson, 20 F. 384, 384 (E.D. Wisc. 1884).

64

243 F. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

65

Id. at 799.

66

DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Co., 959 F.2d 1119, 1121 (1st Cir. 1992).

67

Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971).

68

The Supreme Court set the parameters for the term “seaman” in their 1991 landmark
decision, McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991). Wilander was a
paint foreman who was injured while assigned to a “paint boat” chartered by McDermott
International. His duties consisted of supervising, sandblasting, and painting oil drilling
platforms in the Persian Gulf. His injury resulted from a plug blowing out under pressure and
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The question remains, however, “what is a vessel?”
3. In Navigation
Under the Jones Act, for a structure to be considered a vessel, it must be “in
navigation”69 even though the phrase does not appear anywhere in the Act itself. As
one court said, the term is just another one of the Act’s “several unexplained
definitions.”70 In fact, the term does not appear in any of the statutes amended by, or
incorporated into, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, of which the Jones Act was
part.71 Nevertheless, many students, scholars, academicians, and even judges
continue to cite to the Jones Act’s “vessel in navigation” requirement in treatises,
textbooks, and articles.
The term “vessel in navigation” is actually derived from the 1941 case of
Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co.72 The Carumbo court held that, “[o]ne cannot be a
‘member of a crew’ if the ship is not in navigation.”73 Although the Jones Act
speaks only of seaman,74 many courts like the district court in Carumbo substituted
the word seaman for the commonly used term, “member of the crew.” “Indeed, the
two were often used interchangeably in general maritime cases.”75 In fact, there have
been hundreds of cases comparing the duties of a “seaman” and those of a “member
of the crew.”76 But, for our purposes of defining “vessel,” a seaman is the broader

striking him in the face while he was inspecting a pipe. Id. The Court held that Wilander
could not be precluded from seaman status because he did not perform a transportation-related
function on board or aid in the navigation of a vessel. Id. at 356. In Gizoni v. Southwest
Marine, Inc., 56 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1995), the court developed a two part analysis for
identifying the relationship of a seaman to a vessel; (1) the seaman had to have a “more or less
permanent connection” with the vessel, and (2) a seaman’s job must contribute to the function
or mission of the vessel. Id. at 1141. In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), the
Supreme Court slightly altered the two element test, and stated; (1) the worker’s duties must
contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the
worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels)
that is substantial in both its duration and nature. Id. at 353. In the 1997 case of Harbor Tug
and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997), the Supreme Court once again revisited the
issue, and declared that “for the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the
nature of the inquiry into the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether
the employee’s duties take him to sea.” Id. at 1540.
69
See Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1997) (holding that a
worker may establish seaman status based on his connection to an identifiable group of vessels
in navigation).
70

Johnson v. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1984).

71

See Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, §§ 1-20; Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44;
Act of July 15, 1918, ch. 152, §§ 1-4.
72

123 F.2d 991 (1941).

73

Id. at 995.

74

46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).

75

McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348 (1991).

76

See generally Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
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term that includes “member of a crew.”77
Those magic words, “in navigation,” ushered in a whole new era for the
determination of “what is a vessel?” under the Jones Act. It set forth a beginning for
the current line of decisions requiring a seaman to have a connection to a “vessel in
navigation.”78 The term is still in use today.79
A “‘vessel’ [in navigation] is one that is capable of use as a vessel even if not
functioning as such at the moment in question.”80 “As properly construed, the ‘in
navigation’ requirement is used in its broad sense, and is not confined strictly to
actual navigating or movement of the vessel, but instead means that the vessel is
engaged as an instrument of commerce or transportation on navigable waters.”81
“Case law indicates that a vessel is ‘in navigation’ although moored to a pier, in a
repair yard for periodic repairs, or while temporarily attached to some object.”82
The court in Johnson v. Oil Transport Co.83 noted:
[N]o precise common test for determining when a vessel is in navigation
underlies the various decisions on the subject. ‘It is impossible to define
the phrase (‘in navigation’), in general terms; the words are colloquial and
their fringe will always be somewhat ragged. Perhaps the best hope is
that, as the successive variants appear, they will finally serve rudely to fix
the borders.’84
Vessels may be categorized into three groups in order to further isolate the “in
navigation” requirement: (1) vessels under construction, (2) stationary vessels, or
vessels undergoing short term repairs, and (3) vessels permanently removed from
service. Only those vessels in the second category qualify as being “in navigation.”
“Historically, ship construction is not regarded as a traditional maritime activity;
a ship under construction has not evolved into vessel status.”85 In Tucker v.
Alexandroff,86 the court eloquently said:
A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is
preserved. Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and
iron--an ordinary piece of personal property--as distinctly a land structure

77

Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 994 (1st Cir. 1941).

78

Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354.

79
See Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1997) (stating there was
no dispute that the plaintiff worked aboard a “vessel in navigation”); Gipson v. Kajima Eng’g
and Constr., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 537, 542 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that barge YFN-946 was
not a “vessel in navigation” under the Jones Act).
80

Farrell Ocean Servs., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1982).

81

Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1975).

82

Id.

83

440 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1971).

84

Id. at 115 (quoting Hawn v. American S.S.Co., 107 F.2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1939)).

85

Orgeron v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 561 So. 2d 38, 42 (La. 1990).

86

183 U.S. 424 (1902).
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as a house . . . . In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and
from the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and
becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction.87
Even “a launched but uncompleted vessel floating or maneuvering in navigable
waters . . . is not yet an instrumentality of commerce- private or public- and is
therefore not ‘in navigation.’”88
In addition, “a vessel does not cease to be a vessel when she is not voyaging, but
is at anchor, berthed, or at dockside.”89 “[A] vessel which temporarily leaves
commerce, enters a shipyard for minor repairs, and thereupon returns to commerce
remains in navigation . . . .”90
In determining the status of a vessel in repair, the Supreme Court in West v.
United States91 stated, “the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern of
the repairs, and the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done, rather than
the specific type of work that each . . . workman is doing . . . .”92 The court in
Waganer v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,93 restated the West repair requirements and
noted, “the ship in question must have been in navigational status, and not ‘dead,’
which in turn depends upon whether the contracted work is minor or major, and who
has custody and control of the ship while the work is being done.”94 “If the owner
[has] taken control of [the] ship from the contractor at that point, this would be some
evidence that the ship was in navigation after being taken out of navigation.”95
The court in Warwick v. Huthnance Division, Grace Offshore Co.96 synthesized
some of the earlier cases,97 and developed six factors for use in determining whether
a vessel has been removed from navigation:
(1) The nature of the repairs being performed on the vessel; (2) The
duration of these repairs; (3) The cost of those repairs in comparison to
the value of the vessel; (4) Whether the owner of the vessel has
relinquished control of the repairs to a third party; (5) The length of time
in which the vessel was laid up or stacked; (6) Whether the repair work
was typical of work performed primarily by shore-based employees.98
87

Id. at 438.

88

Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971).

89

DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1121 (1st Cir. 1992).

90

Delome v. Union Barge Line Co., 444 F.2d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 1971).

91

361 U.S. 118 (1959).

92

Id. at 122.

93

486 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1973).

94

Id. at 958.

95

McKinley v. All Alaskan Seafood, Inc., 980 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1992).

96

760 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. La. 1991).

97

See Abshire v. Sea Coast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1982); Rodgers v. United
States, 452 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1972).
98

Warwick v. Huthnance Div., Grace Offshore Co., 760 F. Supp. 571, 573 (W.D. 1991).
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“At some point, however, repairs become sufficiently significant that the vessel
can no longer be considered in navigation.”99 “Major overhaul or refitting of a vessel
will take the vessel out of navigation.”100 “It is equally apparent that conversion of
the vessel from one use to another would also take the ship out of navigation, if the
change required extensive work.”101
In one of the more interesting cases, Donald McClendon, who was acting as a
caretaker on a towboat, attempted to produce gold by cooking mercury inside of a
potato using the ship’s oven.102 The ship “was in dry-dock for numerous repairs and
in dire need of a new bottom. Not surprisingly, McClendon sustained injuries from
breathing mercury vapors,”103 and made a claim under the Jones Act because he was
on a vessel in navigation.104 The court found that reasonable persons could not
conclude that the vessel was in navigation since the ship had no captain or crew, no
power of her own, and was “undergoing extensive repairs by contract workers which
would eventually take seventy-seven days to complete and over $25 million to pay
for.”105
If a vessel has changed its function, it may lose its navigation ability, and
consequently lose its vessel status.106 “In Gonzales v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp., it was held that a ship is not in navigation if there is no
present hope or intention of having her go to sea and if it would take a long time to
put her in shape for an ocean voyage.”107
As Judge Hale eloquently stated, in the case of Bishop v. Alaska S. S. Co.,108
when he described a vessel taken permanently out of navigation:
There was a tang of salt air and movement of wind and wave about the
S.S. Fortuna as she lay on the blocks in floating dry dock, and perhaps
gulls perched on her railings or soared above her stacks, and to everyone
who looked upon her she seemed a ship of the sea.109
Circuit Judge Timbers also expressed similar sentiments in the case of the

99

Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 374 (1991).

100

McKinley, 980 F.2d at 570.

101

Id.

102

McClendon v. OMI Offshore Marine Serv., 807 F. Supp. 1266, 1267 (E.D. Tex. 1992).

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

See Ross v. Moak, 388 F. Supp. 461 (M.D. La. 1975) (holding that a vessel which had
been turned into a bookstore was no longer in navigation).
107
New England Fish Co. v. Barge or Vessel, Sonya, 332 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D. Alaska
1971) (citing Gonzales v. U.S. Board of Shipping Emer. Fleet Corp., 3 F.2d 168 (E.D.N.Y.
1924)).
108

404 P.2d 990 (Wash. 1965).

109

Id. at 991.
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McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,110 in which the Bark Peking was retired and turned
into a floating museum. “The Peking would like nothing more than to slip its
moorings, ease into the harbor and head for the open seas, with the seagulls in its
wake. Sadly, it is fated not to do so.”111
In the case of Boyd v. Ford Motor Co.,112 the court of appeals identified several
factors discussed by the district court in their determination that a vessel was taken
permanently out of service:
(1) the ship was not sailing and in fact secured with special ‘winter-lines’;
(2) the full crew was not stationed aboard the ship; (3) the vessel’s main
engine had been completely ‘torn down’ and was not in operable
condition; and (4) the vessel had lost her classification with the U.S. Coast
Guard, and could not regain it without an inspection.113
B. Analysis
In terms of the Jones Act, some courts114 make reference to a “vessel” using
language from the Supreme Court’s 1903 opinion in The Robert W. Parsons,115
although that case was decided long before the Jones Act.116 In 1973, the Fifth
Circuit case of Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc.,117 updated the language of
The Robert W. Parsons with their own version of what constitutes a vessel,118 and
110

676 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1982).

111

Id. at 44.

112

948 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1991).

113

Id. at 286.

114

Admiralty claims are generally heard by a judge, not a jury. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 38, “Jury Trial of Right”, states, “[a]dmiralty and [m]aritime [c]laims . . . shall not
be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim
within the meaning of Rule 9(h).” FED. R. CIV. P. § 38(e). However, under the Jones Act, a
seaman is entitled to a jury trial. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). See also Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (holding that a seaman who joined in a single complaint,
a maintenance and cure claim and a Jones Act claim, both arising out of one set of facts, was
entitled to a jury trial). A seaman may also sue in state court, but that action cannot be
removed to federal court. Id. (See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp, 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.
1952); Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that state
court suits based on Jones Act claims are not removable). The Jones Act incorporates the antiremoval provisions from the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), ch. 149, §§ 1-10, 35
Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994)) as decided by the Supreme Court in
the case of Panama R Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)).
115

191 U.S. 17, 30 (1903). “In fact, neither size, form, equipment, nor means of
propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the
purpose for which the craft was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged.” Id.
116
See Smith v. Texaco Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1313, 1314 (E.D. La. 1981) (discussing the test
for vessel status).
117

472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973).

118

Id. at 1001. A vessel is one which is designed or used primarily “for the transportation
of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across navigable waters.” Id. at 1002.
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many courts have adopted that terminology in one form or another.119 Still other
courts make use of the general maritime definition of vessel found in Title I of the
United States Code,120 the text of which, was originally conceived in the Act of 1866.
That definition was expanded upon by the Supreme Court in their 1887 decision in
Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.121 Finally, to further muddy the waters, the 1941
district court’s holding in Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co.122 stated that a Jones Act
vessel had to be “in navigation.”123
As a result, courts have inconsistently interpreted the meaning of the word
“vessel” using some or all of the elements of Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., The
Robert W. Parsons, Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., the United States Code,
and Cape Cod S.S. Co. For example, in the case of Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph
Corp.,124 “the court held that a floatable crane was a vessel for purposes of an action
for breach of warranty of seaworthiness without even deciding whether it was a
‘vessel in navigation’ for purposes of the Jones Act.”125 Similarly, the court in
McSweeney v. M.J. Rudolph Corp.,126 also declined to decide whether the same
floatable crane was a “vessel in navigation” for purposes of the Jones Act.127
1. The United States Code Definition
Some admiralty statutes, which do not contain a definition of the word “vessel,”
rely on the United States Code’s definition as authority.128 Title 1, “General
Provisions”, Section 3 of the United States Code states, “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water.”129 In one of the most famous
quotes in admiralty jurisprudence, Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit thought the Code
term was so vague, he sarcastically noted, “[n]o doubt the three men in a tub would
also fit within our definition of ‘vessel’, and one probably could make a convincing

119
See Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996); Powers v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr.
Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984).
120
“The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. §
3 (1994).
121

119 U.S. 625 (1887).

122

123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).

123

Id. at 995.

124

514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975).

125

Buccellato v. City of New York, 808 F. Supp. 967, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing
Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975)).
126

575 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).

127

Buccellato, 808 F. Supp. at 973 (citing McSweeney v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 575 F.
Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. (1983)).
128

See discussion infra.

129

1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
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case for Jonah inside the whale.”130
The Code definition of vessel originally comes from an Act passed by Congress
in 1866 for the prevention of smuggling.131 The definition then appeared in the
Revised Statutes of 1873132 before the United States Code was constituted by the Act
of 1947.133 It is presented in Title 1 of the Code under “Chapter 1.--Rules of
Construction,”134 “thus indicating that it was enacted as a rule for the construction of
the federal statutes generally.”135
In the 1887 case of Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.,136 the Supreme Court first
addressed the definition of the word “vessel” found in the 1873 Revised Statutes
(and later the U.S. Code). In that case, the plaintiffs argued that their floating drydock was “a large floating vessel and water-craft and artificial contrivance, used and
capable of being used as a means of transportation in water . . .”137 The Court held
that, “[a] fixed structure, such as this dry-dock is, not used for the purpose of
navigation . . . . The fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or
vessel . . . .”138 The Court also noted the words of Lord Justice Brett, an English
court of appeals judge who said that a vessel is something “built in a particular form
and used for a particular purpose.”139 In effect, the Court required that a structure
needs to do more than just float, and that one should look to the particular purpose
for which it was built before determining its status as a vessel.
Mr. Justice Brown, in the 1903 Supreme Court case of The Robert W. Parsons,140
took the words of his predecessors in Cope one step further by stating, “[i]n fact,
neither size, form, equipment, nor means of propulsion are determinative factors
upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft
was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged.”141 Justice Brown
seemingly ignored the terminology found in the Revised Statutes, and instead
borrowed language from earlier court decisions, including The General Cass142 in
1871. In that case, the court stated, “[t]he true criterion by which to determine
whether any water craft, or vessel, is subject to admiralty jurisdiction, is the business
or employment for which it is intended, or is susceptible of being used, or in which it

130

Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1982).

131

Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 1, 14 Stat. 178.

132

1 Rev. St. U.S. § 3 (1873)

133

Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633.

134

1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).

135

Lambros Seaplane Base v. the Batory, 215 F.2d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 1954).

136

119 U.S. 625 (1887).

137

Id. at 626.

138

Id. at 627.

139

Id. at 629.

140

191 U.S. 17 (1903).

141

Id. at 30.

142

10 F. Cas. 169 (E.D. Mich. 1871) (No. 5,307).
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is actually engaged, rather than its size, form, capacity, or means of propulsion.”143
In the 1944 case of Norton v. Warner Co.,144 the Supreme Court once again
revisited the general maritime definition of vessel when they determined that a barge
was a vessel for purposes of resolving an injury claim under the Jones Act.145 Thus,
on some occasions the court chooses to make use of the general maritime definition
of the word “vessel,” and at other times they choose not to. This remains the case
today.146
2. Comparison to the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
A comparison of the Jones Act to the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act (LHWCA) is a useful analysis because like the Jones Act, the LHWCA does not
contain a definition of the word “vessel.”147 However, most courts interpreting the
LHWCA have adopted the general maritime definition of “vessel” found in the
United States Code.148 This leads to an inference that maybe the same theory of
“adoption” could be made for the Jones Act use of the Code definition.
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) of
1927 was remedial legislation intended to provide a remedy to workers injured
during longshoring activities.149 In reference to a “vessel,” the LHWCA stated:
the term ‘vessel’ means any vessel upon which or in connection with
which any person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or
death arising out of or in the course of his employment, and said vessel’s
owner, owner pro hacvice, agent, operator, charter or bare boat charterer,
master, officer, or crew member.150
“Obviously this definition does not provide precise guidance as to what is included
within the term ‘vessel.’ The legislative history similarly is not helpful.”151
Before enactment of the LHWCA, longshoremen were not covered by admiralty
remedies, and could not seek relief through state compensation systems.152 The
143

Id. at 170 (citing The Kate Tremaine, 14 F. Cas. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 7,622).).

144

321 U.S. 565 (1944).

145

Id. at 571-72.

146

See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1313, 1314 (E.D. La. 1991) (referencing use of
the general maritime definition).
147
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, §§ 1-50, 44
Stat. 1424-46 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994)).

The 1984 Amendment to the Act substituted “Longshore” for “Longshoremen’s”,
although the Act is frequently mis-cited using its former name. Pub. L. 98-426, § 27(d)(1), 98
Stat. 1654.
148

Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1992).

149

33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1994).

150

Id. § 902(21) (1994).

151

McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1983).

152

Merrill v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry., 751 F. Supp. 770, 775 (C.D. Ill. 1990)
(referencing the LHWCA, ch. 509, § 2(3), 44 Stat. 1426 (1927) (codified as amended at 33
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LHWCA proceeded to cover workers injured or killed only on navigable waters or
certain adjoining areas of land.153 This rigid “situs” requirement quickly created
inconsistent results because “it allowed workers, during their normal work day, to
walk in and out of LHWCA coverage as they moved to and from dry land.”154 In
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,155 and the related case of Marine Stevedoring
Corp. v. Oosting,156 “four workers were injured or killed when a crane knocked them
from their workplace. One worker drowned, and because his body fell into the water
he was covered by the LHWCA; conversely the other three fell onto a pier or were
crushed against a railroad car,” but the court denied LHWCA coverage to these men
because they were hurt on land.157
In response to these types of cases, Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972 by
broadening the “situs” requirement to allow recovery for “an injury occurring upon
the navigable waters of the United States including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a
vessel” (emphasis added).158 Unfortunately, in terms of the word “vessel,” this
amendment added only a “circular definition”159 to the statute.
Since the LHWCA itself does not provide a definition of the word “vessel,” most
courts have applied the general maritime definition found in the United States
Code.160 In fact, “[s]ome courts have stated that [the United States Code definition],
as a matter of law, provides the LHWCA ‘vessel’ definition.”161 As the court noted
in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,162 “[s]ince Congress, in its use of the term ‘vessel’
in sections 902(21) and 905(b) [of the LHWCA], did not provide a definition
different from the generally acknowledged one found in section 3 [of title 1 of the
United States Code], we may presume, as other courts have, that it intended to adopt
this commonly-used term.”163
An argument can be made, therefore, that since the first proviso of the Jones Act
also does not mention the word vessel,164 the Act should simply adopt the general
maritime definition, much as the LHWCA has done. The court in Bollinger Quick
U.S.C. § 903(a) (1994)).
153

P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 70 (1979).

154

Merrill, 751 F. Supp. at 775.

155

396 U.S. 212 (1969).

156

238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965).

157

Merrill, 751 F. Supp. at 775.

158

33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1994). The 1972 Amendment to the LHWCA was Pub. L. No. 92576, § 1, 86 Stat. 1251.
159

McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 133.

160

DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D.R.I. 1993).

161

Id.

162

716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983).

163

Id. at 134.

164

See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1994).
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Repair, Inc. v. M/V Goliath165 commented, “[t]he general definition of ‘vessel’ set
out by Congress [in the United States Code] . . . applies to every federal statute,
unless that statute itself prescribes another definition.”166
Other courts have also stated that the general maritime definition of “vessel” is
applicable for interpreting Jones Act claims. “[Although] there is a slightly different
inquiry in a Jones Act case as distinguished from a LHWCA case [“[a] Jones Act
seaman must have a more or less permanent attachment to a vessel or fleet of
vessels, while recovery under . . . the LHWCA can be based upon transitory contact
with a vessel.”167], [it] is a distinction without significance . . . since . . . these
additional elements do not render useless Jones Act cases addressing the ‘vessel’
issue.”168
The court in Lash v. Ballard Construction, Co.169 further explained, “The ‘vessel’
issue is a jurisdictional issue whether the matter is being considered in the context of
the Jones Act or the LHWCA, and the additional elements that must be demonstrated
in a Jones Act case are easily separated from the analysis.”170 Benedict on Admiralty
also suggested their meanings were to be construed the same,
While one may not ascribe to the Congress an intent to restate maritime
law when it enacted a definition for the construction of statutes generally,
it is highly unlikely that Congress, in formulating a definition of a word of
so immediate a connection with maritime law and so likely to recur in
maritime legislation, could have intended materially to depart from the
meaning under general maritime law.171
Further support for using the general maritime definition in determining Jones
Act claims is evidenced by the similarity of language relating to both statutes. The
general maritime definition is very similar to the terminology used in the Shipping
Acts of 1916 and 1918,172 which was later incorporated into the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920,173 of which the Jones Act was part.174 In fact, except for a few choice
words, (i.e. stocks), the definition is almost identical. The Supreme Court stated in
Warner v. Goltra,175 “[t]he purpose of the lawmakers, clear enough, we believe, upon
the surface of the act, takes on an added clearness when the act is viewed in the

165

965 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Or. 1997).

166

Id. at 1455.

167

Orgeron v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 561 So. 2d 38, 41 (La. 1990).

168

Lash v. Ballard Constr. Co., 707 F. Supp. 461, 463 (W.D. Wash. 1989).

169

707 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Wash. 1989).

170

Id. at 463.

171

1 STEPHEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, § 165, at 10-11 (7th ed. rev. 1997).

172

Compare Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44, with 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).

173

Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 37.

174

Id. at § 33.

175

293 U.S. 155 (1934).
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setting of its history.”176 “We cannot believe that in this process of amendment the
word[s] . . . lost the broad meaning that it had in the law to be amended . . . .”177
Arguably then, the language of the U.S. Code could be applicable to Jones Act
cases.178
In a final comparison, the Jones Act term, “in navigation,” has taken on a
meaning virtually identical to the “capability” requirement identified in the general
maritime jurisdiction. The latter definition states that a vessel is one that is “used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”179 In fact, the Fifth
Circuit in Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enterprises, Inc.180 held that in order
for a longshoreman to make a claim under the LHWCA, the structure must first
qualify as a Jones Act vessel.181
Some courts, however, disagree with the use of the general maritime definition as
a means of interpreting the Jones Act. The Fifth Circuit explained in Sohyde Drilling
& Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,182 “we are not convinced that the
term ‘vessel’ for Jones Act purposes, which is subject to liberal construction
consistent with the purposes of the Act, is necessarily a vessel for other purposes as
well.”183 The court in Mark Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit,184 remarked that the
definition of vessel under the LHWCA (the general maritime definition) “is more
inclusive than that used for evaluating seaman status under the Jones Act.”185 The
court in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking186 also observed, “[i]n contrast, cases decided
under the Jones Act . . . have looked to a different test [other than the 1 U.S.C. § 3
definition], in determining what is a vessel for Jones Act purposes.”187
In general, there does not appear to be much consensus for using the U.S. Code
definition of the word vessel in deciding Jones Act claims. However, its mention in
some recent cases indicates that it is still a factor that the court considers in making
their determination of a vessel’s status.
3. Resolution
It quickly becomes apparent how much confusion has arisen over the seemingly
176

Id. at 159.

177

Id.

178

Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973).

179

1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).

180

Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enters., Inc., 877 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1989).

181

Id. at 395-96; see also Holifield v. Great Lake Dredge & Dock, Co., CIV.A.92-1935,
1993 WL 370831, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 1993) (comparing vessels under the Jones Act and
the LHWCA).
182

644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981).

183

Id. at 1137.

184

No. 94-1581, 1996 WL 37973, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 6, 1996).

185

Id. at *3.

186

716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983).

187

Id. at 134.
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simple task of defining the word “vessel” under admiralty jurisdiction. Different
criteria used at different times have made the process inconsistent and unpredictable.
One could make a claim under the Jones Act and be denied relief because the vessel
was not in navigation, but be granted relief under general maritime law because the
vessel need not be in navigation, all in the same case!188 In Williams v. Avondale
Shipyards, Inc.,189 “Edgar J. Williams either slipped on an oil spot or became
engaged in a fistfight” and “struck a pipe instead of a jaw” during a final sea trial run
of the USCG Cutter Hamilton.190 For purposes of recovery under the Jones Act, the
vessel was not yet, at such time, an instrumentality of commerce and, therefore, was
not “in navigation.”191 Under general maritime law, however, the vessel did not need
to be “in navigation,” and Williams was able to sue the owner for injuries sustained
while on the incomplete vessel in navigable waters.192 As the court in Salgado v.
M.J. Rudolph Corp.193 so aptly noted, “[t]here has been so much litigation over the
meaning and scope of the Jones Act that it has been remarked that the Supreme
Court should have struck it down ‘as offensive to the due process clause by reason of
impossibly bad drafting.’”194
a. The Car Analogy
As the previous case illustrates, the law does not recognize the same concept of
the word “vessel” under all statutes in admiralty. This is an odd notion, given that
most people presumably know what a ship or vessel is, much as they do a car.195
This analogy is better exemplified by the 1919 Supreme Court decision in McBoyle
v. United States.196 In that case, the petitioner was convicted of transporting from
Ottawa, Illinois to Guymon, Oklahoma an airplane that he knew to have been stolen.
The question was whether the National Motor Vehicle Act Theft Act applied to
airplanes. The Act stated that “[t]he term ‘motor vehicle’ shall include an
automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other selfpropelled vehicle not designed for running on rails . . . .”197 Justice Holmes noted:
188

See Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 956-57 (5th Cir. 1971).

189

Id. at 955.

190

Id. at 956-57.

191

Id. at 959.

192

Hall v. Hvide Hull No. 3, 746 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1984) (referencing the decision in
Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1971)).
193

514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975).

194

Id. at 753 (quoting GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY,
282 (1st ed. 1957) referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Panama R Co. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375 (1924)). Regardless of how badly the Jones Act was drafted, the court in Leonard v.
Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522 (1978), noted that cases which “deviate from the general practice
[of] permitting Jones Act issues to be submitted to the jury . . . should be applied
restrictively.” Id. at 524.
195

See generally McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).

196

Id.

197

Id. at 26.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/5

20

1998]

WHAT IS A VESSEL?

725

No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word [vehicle] to signify
a conveyance working on land, water or air . . . But in everyday speech
‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land . . . .
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is crossed.
When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common
mind only [a commonly held notion], the statute should not be
extended . . . upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it,
very likely broader words would have been used.198
Justice Holmes’ “vehicle essay” can easily be applied in a more present day
context. In today’s world, cars come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and styles.
Numerous types of people drive a car: doctors, students, lawyers, janitors, and
grandparents to name just a few. Under one law, a person may get their driver’s
license revoked for driving while intoxicated,199 while under another law, a fine may
be levied for blasting the car stereo too loudly.200 The serviceman working on your
car may be sued for negligent repairs and breach of contract under one law,201 or the
auto dealer may be required to substitute a new car under some consumer protection
“lemon” laws.202 In each case, there is some connection to a car, and a wrong has
been committed, yet the answer to “what is a car?” remains the same regardless of
which law is applied.203 Whether the “connection” to the car is by a driver,
repairman, or dealer, or whether it is a Cadillac or Jeep, a car has certain and distinct
readily identifiable characteristics (i.e. engine, wheels). A car is a car is a car is a
car.
198

Id. at 26-27.

199

CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(a) (West 1998). “It is unlawful while under the influence of
any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage or
drug, to drive a vehicle . . . .” Id.
200
CAL. VEH. CODE § 27007 (West 1985). “No driver of a vehicle shall operate, or permit
the operation of, any sound amplification system which can heard outside the vehicle from 50
or more feet . . . .” Id.
201
CAL. COM. CODE § 2711 (West 1964). “Where the seller fails to make delivery or
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance . . . the buyer may
cancel . . . .” Id.
202

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West 1970). “If the manufacturer or its representative in this
state does not service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly
replace the new motor vehicle . . . or promptly make restitution to the buyer . . . .” Id.
203

See CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (West 1987). “‘A motor vehicle’” is a vehicle that is selfpropelled.” Id.; See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 100 (West 1987). “Unless the provision or
context otherwise requires, these definitions shall govern the construction of this code.” Id.;
CAL. VEH. CODE § 10 (West 1959). “Whenever any reference is made to any portion of this
code or any other law, such reference shall apply to all amendments and additions heretofore
or hereafter made.” Id.
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Justice Holmes’ essay can easily be analogized to the issue of “what is a vessel?”
To paraphrase, it is possible to interpret the word vessel by conjuring up all kinds of
strange objects that might somehow find their way onto a body of water. Yet, in
everyday speech, a vessel, much like a car, has inherent common characteristics. It
is only reasonable for the law to take that common understanding of vessel, so that
people have an opportunity to gain some knowledge of the rules for which they
apply. As the Fifth Circuit noted, “a kangaroo is no less a kangaroo because it is
carried for part of its existence in another kangaroo’s pouch.”204
The rules of statutory construction do “not exclude the application of common
sense to the terms made use of in the act in order to avoid an absurdity, which the
legislature ought not to be presumed to have intended.”205 “The proper course in all
cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context, and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.”206
If the term “vessel” was meant to imply a greater meaning than that which is
commonly understood, the drafters of the legislation would have made that point
implicitly clear.207 Therefore, we are left with a definition of the term which most
ordinary, prudent people commonly hold. As the court in Sacramento Navigation
Co. v. Salz208 noted, “[t]he fact that we are dealing with vessels, which by a fiction of
the law are invested with personality, does not require us to disregard the actualities
of the situation . . . .”209
Directly on point was the frustration experienced by dissenting Circuit Judge
Toreulla in the case of DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc.210 In that case, the court
held that the “BETTY F,” which was a steel hulled barge designed to transport
cargo, was not a vessel under the Jones Act because it was being used only as a work
platform and had no means of self propulsion.211 Judge Toreulla argued that
“[n]otwithstanding the lack of a statutory definition for the term ‘vessel’ in the Jones
Act . . . at least twenty-four maritime or maritime related laws define ‘vessel’ in such
manner as to clearly include the “BETTY F” within the scope of their description.”212
In his frustration, Judge Toreulla said:
William Shakespeare tells us in a famous passage from Romeo and Juliet
that labels are not important, but rather that content is what counts. In
more recent times, Gertrude Stein had similar advice. Although poetic
204
Farrell Ocean Servs., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Wirth
Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976)).
205

United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 385, 396 (1867).

206

Id.

207

McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (holding that Congress
intended the language of the Jones Act to mean today what it meant at the time the Jones Act
was passed in 1920).
208

273 U.S. 326 (1927).

209

Id. at 328.

210

959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992) (Torruella, J., dissenting).

211

Id. at 1120.

212

Id. at 1124.
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philosophy seems far removed from the hard world of maritime torts, I
believe that the counsel found in those quotations has definite relevance to
the issue that separates my views from those of my colleagues in the
majority.
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.”
Shakespeare, William, Romeo and Juliet, II, ii, 43.
“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”
Stein, Gertrude, Sacred Emily (1913).213
b. The Three Prong Test
The lack of a generally recognized definition of the word “vessel” is probably
inconsequential in a great number of maritime cases, since the structure in question
is obviously engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers over water, and fits
within the common sense notion of the term. However, problems do arise in trying
to determine whether a structure is a “vessel” in cases involving floating docks, ships
under construction or out of service, and special function or unusual crafts. Since
“[a] jury is too blunt an instrument to answer a complex question of legal
policy. . . ;”214 a step-by-step procedure could be of great benefit to those whose
responsibility it is to determine whether a structure classifies as a vessel. Hence, my
three prong test follows.
My three-factor test or three-prong approach provides some guidance through the
maze of inconsistency. It is designed to eliminate many of the uncertainties that
exist in this area, and create a standard of tests in order to produce more consistent
results. These tests mesh all of the critical elements previously discussed into a
three-factor examination, in which each factor must be answered in the affirmative in
order to continue onto the next level.
The first prong I call the “floatation test.” To meet the requirements of this
prong, the structure must comply with the general maritime definition found in the
United States Code which states, “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means
of transportation on water.”215 To paraphrase this definition, all vessels must, at a
minimum, float or be capable of floating. The basis for including this requirement
rests in the general statutory notion that, to the extent a maritime claim is governed
by federal statute, that definition should control, otherwise the general maritime
definition of the Code will control.216
The test mandates that a structure will not be considered a vessel if it is incapable
of independent floatation, or somehow maintains a permanent affixation to land.
Conversely, if the attachment to land is merely temporary, or there is no attachment
at all, and the structure is capable of floatation, one proceeds to the next factor of the

213

Id.

214

Boy Scouts of America v. Graham, 76 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1996).

215

1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).

216

Bollinger Quick Repair, Inc. v. M/V Goliath, 965 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (D. Or. 1997).
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analysis.
One of more interesting cases was the situation in Provost v. Huber.217 Paul
Huber “purchased a two-story frame house in Bayfield County, Wisconsin with the
purpose in mind of moving the structure from the mainland to a lot on Madeline
Island situated in Lake Superior. Huber hired a housemover to transport the building
and contents by truck-trailer over the frozen surface of Lake Superior.”218 “[A]t a
point approximately three-fourths of the way to the island, the truck, trailer, house
and contents broke through the ice.219 Huber claimed that the tractor-trailer was a
“vessel” because he was transporting the house over water. The court declared,
“[b]y no stretch of the imagination can we equate a multi-wheeled device, designed
and built for the purpose of transportation over a hard, defined surface such as roads,
highways, and even ice with a vessel or ship as those terms are useful in maritime
law.”220 Clearly, Huber’s truck was incapable of floatation, and would flunk the first
prong of the test.221
In the case of Nolan v. Coating Specialists, Inc.,222 a sand blaster-spray painter
was injured while working on a stationary drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico.
He made a claim under Jones Act jurisdiction,223 but the court of appeals affirmed the
district court’s holding that fixed offshore platforms are not vessels, and workmen
who perform all of their duties on such platforms are not seaman.224
In Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Services, Inc.,225 George E.
Blanchard, a mechanic, was injured while working on compressors located in
shallow waters near a marshy area in the Mississippi River delta. Two of the
compressors were housed in a building which stood on pilings driven into the
ground. The other two compressors were housed in buildings mounted on
submersible barges.226 The court held that the buildings mounted on virtually sunken
barges were not vessels under the Jones Act227 since they were permanently attached
to the ocean floor. The court further noted that, “[o]ur holding might be different if
217

594 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979).

218

Id. at 718.

219

Id.

220

Id. at 719.

221

An interesting side note about Huber was that a short time later, he “was approached by
an individual representing himself to be an underwater contractor and who suggested that the
house be sunk to the bottom of the lake to preserve and protect it from ice damage until such
time that it could be raised when the weather permitted.” Id. Unfortunately for Mr. Huber, he
agreed, and the house was lowered to the bottom of the lake by placing sandbags on its floor.
When the weather finally warmed up, an attempt was made to retrieve the house, but it was
completely destroyed as it was being raised. Id.
222

422 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1970).

223

Id. at 378.

224

Id. at 379.

225

575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978).

226

Id. at 1141.

227

Id. at 1141-42.
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Blanchard had been injured while the structures were being floated into position.”228
The court’s conjecture presumably depended upon the intended purpose of the
barges before they were sunk into place. This leads into Prong two, “Purpose.”
My second prong asks the question, “what is the purpose of the craft?” Under
this prong, the analysis is accomplished by using the concepts outlined in two turn of
the century Supreme Court cases, Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.229 and The Robert
W. Parsons.230 Here, one looks to “the purpose for which the craft was constructed
and the business it which it is engaged.”231 The more modern terminology was
developed in 1973 by the Fifth Circuit in the case of Cook v. Belden Concrete
Products, Inc.232 In Cook, the court defined a vessel’s purpose as being, “designed
for transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across
navigable waters.”233 That definition appears to have been adopted in one form or
another by virtually every other circuit.234
Identifying the purpose is critical because, “[m]ere floatation on water does not
constitute a structure a ‘vessel’. . . .”235 Rafts and special purpose structures get
special scrutiny under this query.
This prong is designed to eliminate the absurdity used by some courts in
rationalizing their opinions when considering the status of a vessel. It is this liberal
interpretation which has sometimes crept its way into the fray, as evidenced by the
court’s statement in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,236 “virtually any capacity for use
as seagoing transportation--perhaps even the hypothetically plausible possibility has
sufficed to lend the dignity of ‘vessel’ status to a host of seemingly unlikely craft.”237
In A Raft of Spars,238 the court held that a raft of logs, with no one aboard,
floating down the East River was within admiralty jurisdiction.239 Chief Justice
Taney of the Maryland Supreme Court held otherwise in the 1853 case of Tome v.
Four Cribs of Lumber.240 In that case, Taney said that rafts “are not the subjectmatter of admiralty jurisdiction . . . .”241 “They are not vehicles intended for the
228

Id. at 1143, n.5.

229

See generally Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887).

230

See generally The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).

231

Id. at 30.

232

472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973).

233

Id. at 1002.

234
See Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996); Powers v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr.
Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984).
235

Cook, 472 F.2d at 1001.

236

716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983).

237

Id. at 134

238

20 F. Cas. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 11,529).

239

Id. at 175.

240

24 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.D. Md. 1853) (No. 14,083).

241

Id. at 24.
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navigation of the sea, or the arms of the sea; they are not recognised[sic] as
instruments of commerce or navigation by any act of congress . . . .”242 Those words
could be probably be applied to any number of special purpose craft today. Compare
the case of Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.243 decided 120 years later in which the
court held that a raft, made of 12 X 12 timbers bonded together, was not a vessel in
spite of its occasional voyages and “brief movement [which] consisted of being
hauled, poled or paddled . . . .”244 The court stated that the raft’s transportation was
“incidental to its intended use.”245
In the case of Garret v. Dean Shank Drilling Co.,246 Richie Garret made a claim
under the Jones Act for injuries suffered aboard a barge he was working. The barge,
moored in the navigable waters of Louisiana, consisted of a hull and flat deck only
but was being outfitted with fixtures and appurtenances necessary to render it
capable for use as an oil and gas drilling rig.247 The court of appeals agreed with
Garret’s employer that the barge was never in navigation for the purpose for which it
was intended, and therefore not a vessel in navigation.248
There was also the case of Wenzel’s Estate by Mirikitani v. Seaward Marine
Services, Inc.249 In that case, Kenneth Wenzel was assigned to clean the hull of the
USS Rathburne. “Underwater divers, utilizing hand-held scrapers, brushes and a
device known as the ‘SCAMP’, accomplished the cleaning process. ‘SCAMP’ is an
acronym for a submersible cleaning and maintenance platform,”250 which was a
saucer shaped unit, equipped with an impeller capable of being “operated by remote
control or steered manually by divers.”251 While he was underwater, cleaning the
hull, Wenzel died of asphyxiation. Wenzel’s estate claimed that the “SCAMP” was
a vessel, and he was a seaman assigned to it.252 The court of appeals held that it was
an error for the district court to determine as a matter of law that the “SCAMP” was
not a vessel, and remanded the issue back to them.253
The harder cases to analyze on this point are those which involve permanent
structures, such as offshore drilling rigs, which have to be floated into place before
arriving at their final resting spot. Clearly, these structures are not vessels once
attached to the ocean or river floor.254 But, the question of their status while being
242

Id.

243

477 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1973).

244

Id. at 647.

245

Id.

246

799 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1986).

247

Id. at 1008-09.

248

Id. at 1011.

249

709 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983).

250

Id. at 1326-27.

251

Id. at 1327-28.

252

Id. at 1327.

253

Id. at 1328.

254

See Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978)
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transported into position is an issue.
The court in Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc.,255 distinguished two
different types of movement for establishing the purpose for which a craft is
constructed. The first movement was that of a conventional ship or barge used “for
transportation of passengers, cargo or equipment from place to place across
navigable waters.”256 The second was the “movement, both perpendicular and
lateral, [which] is necessarily part of the regular operation of floating dry docks and
similar structures.” Such capability alone, would be “insufficient to establish that
such craft are construed for the purpose of navigation.”257
Using these criteria, the positioning of an offshore oilrig, would be movement
incidental to its intended function of drilling, and therefore, would not qualify it as a
vessel during its temporary transportation. In the case of Smith v. Massman
Construction Co.,258 the plaintiff was injured while working “as a welder on a
structure known as a caisson.”259 “The caisson resembles a large topless steel box
approximately 200 feet long, 84 feet wide, and 20 feet high,”260 which was later to
become part of a concrete bridge pier.261 The court held that the caisson was not a
vessel under the Jones Act, even though it carried men and equipment while in
tow.262
My third prong requires a vessel to be “in navigation.” Using the same principle
to discount those vessels which have been withdrawn from navigation and those
vessels which have not yet entered navigation,263 only those structures which are at
use, temporarily at rest, or undergoing “short term” repairs would qualify as a vessel.
This test would eliminate those vessels which have not yet been built, and those
which have been totally removed from service. “[A]n incompleted vessel has yet to
take her place in commerce and navigation; whereas a vessel which has been
commissioned and taken into navigation and commerce remains in that status even
when coming into a dock and undergoing certain repairs.”264
In the case of Caruso v. Sterling Yacht and Shipbuilders, Inc.,265 Francine Caruso
was hired as a cook for the newly constructed vessel, “Bengale I.” “Caruso injured
(holding that a submersed barge, permanently affixed to the ocean floor, was not a vessel).
255

472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973).

256

Id. at 1002 (holding that the limited movement of a structure is not dispositive of vessel
status, but the determinative question of a craft’s status depends on the purpose for which it
was constructed and the business in which it was engaged).
257

Id.

258

607 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1979).

259

Id.

260

Id.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 89.

263

Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1971).

264

Id. at 958, n.5.

265

828 F.2d 14 (11th Cir. 1987).
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her toe while quartered ashore in a hotel,” and brought an action under the Jones
Act.266 Although launched and afloat, the court of appeals affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant since the vessel had not been tested at sea trials nor
delivered to her owner, and was not yet a vessel “in navigation.”267
Compare the 1983 case of McCarthy v. The Bark Peking.268 Craig McCarthy was
injured “while painting the upper mainmast and spars of the Bark Peking, a museum
vessel on exhibit as one of the artifacts at the South Street Seaport Museum.”269 The
vessel’s rudder had been welded into one position, and the ship had not been put to
sea for over 50 years.270 The court of appeals nevertheless held that the Peking
remained a vessel despite her age and current use “as long as she rides at anchor in
the harbor, ready and able to head for the open seas . . . .”271
A similar situation occurred in Luna v. Star of India.272 In this case, a visitor who
slipped and fell on a stairway aboard the Star of India, the oldest merchant vessel
afloat, built in 1863, brought an action.273 The ship was operated by the Maritime
Museum Association of San Diego, and was moored in North San Diego Bay as a
visitor attraction. It had been removed from commerce for over forty years.274
Nonetheless, the court held that the craft was still a vessel under admiralty
jurisdiction because “[s]he has a crew consisting of a licensed master or mate, and
two or three seaman. Her mooring lines and chains can readily be cast off, and the
electric wires are so fitted as to be easily detachable.”275 In addition, visitors “come
aboard [her] to enjoy the unique experience of trodding the decks and inspecting the
lofty rigging of an old sea voyager,”276 and not “merely to view the memorabilia
collected below in a few glass cases . . . .”277
Finally, an example of a vessel removed from service was the case of Kathriner
v. UNISEA, Inc.278 The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the
hull of a liberty ship which had been converted into a floating fish factory, but which
was permanently anchored and tied to a dock, “hooked up to city sewage, city water
mains, telephone lines and cable television,”279 was not a “vessel in navigation” for
266
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716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983).
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purposes of the Jones Act.280 The court stated that the vessel was unfit for offshore
use, and would surely sink if put out to sea.281
In summary, all three prongs need to be satisfied for a structure to be termed a
vessel. Failure to satisfy any one of the above tests will condemn the structure to
non-vessel status, and disqualify any person making a claim under such a
presumption.
The three prong test has universal application as well. There are many admiralty
statutes which relate specifically to an area of law, and which provide relief
depending on certain circumstances. For example, under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, whether one is or is not a “member of the crew” is a
vital consideration when making a claim.282 Under the Jones Act, a seaman, or his
personal representative in case of the death of any seaman must make a claim.283
The Death on the High Seas Act created a wrongful death action for persons killed
on the high seas.284 Nevertheless, the three prong test could be adopted to determine
vessel status in any of these admiralty statutes. Although these statutes define
specific requirements concerning the individual making the claim, and the
relationship that they must maintain with their employer or to a vessel, the notion of
“what is a vessel?” suggests that an independent analysis can be made in isolation,
apart from the other statutory factors.
c. Airplanes and Helicopters
To challenge the methodology of my three prong test by using it to determine
whether floating docks and underwater diving platforms are “vessels” would prove
too easy. A much harder test, and the real opportunity for criticism comes on the
test’s ability to identify jet aircraft as vessels in light of the history on the subject.
The notion of considering airplanes and helicopters as performing some kind of
traditional maritime activity is a strange concept to many, and seems to stretch the
statutorial interpretation of “vessel” to its limit. Nonetheless, under certain
circumstances these structures have been included under admiralty jurisdiction. The
“high-water” mark in this area of law was the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in
Executive Jet, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.285 In that case, the Court held that claims
280

Id. at 663.

281

Id. at 660.
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See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
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See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
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See Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, §§ 1-8, 41 Stat. 537-538, (1920) (codified at
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1994)).
285

409 U.S. 249 (1972). In this case a jet aircraft “struck a flock of seagulls as it was
taking off from Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, Ohio, adjacent to Lake Erie. As a
result, the plane lost its power, crashed and ultimately sank in the navigable waters of Lake
Erie, a short distance from the airport.” Id. at 250.
The Supreme Court held that the location of the incident by itself was not demonstrative
of a maritime tort,
unlike waterborne vessels, [aircraft] are not restrained by one-dimensional geographic
and physical boundaries. For this elementary reason, we conclude that the mere fact
that the alleged wrong ‘occurs’ or ‘is located’ on or over navigable waters--whatever
that means in an aviation context--is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane
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arising from airplane accidents may be cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction if the
“wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."286 As a
result of this landmark decision, most aviation admiralty tort cases are regarded as
either “pre-Executive Jet,”287 or after Executive Jet.
Generally speaking, aircraft are not considered to be vessels for purposes of
invoking admiralty jurisdiction. Looking at previous definitions of vessel as already
identified in the Act of 1866, and the Revised Statutes, it is certain that Congress did
not have airplanes in mind when they defined “vessel,” since both of those statutes
derive from enactments prior to its invention.288 Even by 1920, and the passage of
the Jones Act, “it can hardly be thought that, Congress intended or believed that the
term ‘vessel’ included the primitive aircraft then in use.”289 But, “statutes are not
confined in application to contemporary instances and that their principles are to be
extended to embrace new factual situations and new technological developments.”290
“[F]or Jones Act purposes, the term vessel may include ‘special purpose
structures’ . . . even though such structures were not conceived of until long after the
Jones Act was adopted.”291
Some courts still hold that helicopters perform a traditional maritime activity
when transporting passengers and supplies to offshore sites.292 The Supreme Court
negligence case into a ‘maritime tort.’ It is far more consistent with the history and
purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity. Id. at 268.
The result of Executive Jet was the development of a two-part “locality plus” test in
defining an aviation maritime tort. That test requires a showing that: (1) the alleged wrong
occurs over navigable water, and (2) the wrong bears a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity. Id. at 271.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty in concluding that “a flight that would have been
almost entirely over land and was within the continental United States” bore an insufficient
relationship with traditional maritime activity.” Id. at 272. But, the Court left the door open
regarding the possibility that an aircraft could be engaged in a maritime activity during a
transoceanic flight,
We need not decide today whether an aviation tort can ever, under any circumstances, bear
a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity to come within admiralty jurisdiction
in the absence of legislation. It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying from New
York to London crashed over the mid-Atlantic, there would be admiralty jurisdiction over
resulting tort claims even absent a specific statute. An aircraft in that situation might be
thought to bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because it would be
performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. Id. at 271.
286

Id. at 268.
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Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.C.V.I. 1977) (referring
to some of the “pre-Executive Jet” confusion as to when admiralty jurisdiction attaches).
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See Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky, 116 F.R.D. 397, 416 (D. Conn. 1987)
(holding that a helicopter “used to ferry passengers and supplies to and from off-shore drilling
structures . . . bears a significantly sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity . . .
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has not revisited this issue, causing some consternation in the lower courts. One
court noted, “there is still unheeded the call for the Supreme Court to . . . review a
case and either accept the expansionist view of admiralty jurisdiction [regarding
aircraft] and provide proper guidelines for the application of such jurisdiction or it
should clearly limit the jurisdiction to traditional matters of a maritime nature. . . .”293
In those instances when airplanes and helicopters are allegedly engaged in a
“traditional maritime activity,”294 my three prong test can be a useful tool in the
determining the vessel status of these structures. To do such an analysis will take no
more of an ideological leap than the Supreme Court itself took in Executive Jet when
making the inference.295
The first prong of my test emphasizes the general maritime definition, which
requires that an object must be capable of floatation.296 Clearly, jet airplanes are not
designed for floatation.297 So, one may immediately think that an airplane is doomed
from the outset of the test, failing the first prong, and requiring no further analysis.
This is an incorrect assumption.
Using a more conceptual approach, the airplane itself is not designed to float, but
certainly its passengers are. All airplanes making transoceanic flights are equipped
with inflatable rafts, life preservers for each passenger, and a variety of other
paraphernalia available to crewmembers should the plane go down over the ocean.298
This distinction is made to differentiate airplane passengers, from say bus or train
riders, who have no access to overwater life saving gear.
Airplanes traveling over land from point to point within the continental United
States would normally not be required to carry this specialized equipment.299 The
idea is directly on point with the Supreme Court’s statement that “flights within the
continental United States, which are primarily over land” would not be considered a
traditional maritime activity.300 Case law also clearly supports this theory. A review
of Reeves v. Offshore Logistics, Inc.301 indicates the courts refusal to acknowledge
that a helicopter without pontoons could be engaged in a traditional maritime
activity,302 but one containing all the accouterments of a flying “vessel” could meet
.”). Id.
293
Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.C.V.I. 1977) (quoting
Thomas O. White, The Admiralty Jurisdiction Adrift, 28 PITT. L. REV. 635, 642 (1967)).
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the Executive Jet test.303
Therefore, although airplanes themselves are not floatable objects, those on board
are definitely equipped to handle an unexpected watery landing. In this view, an
airplane can be considered as having the “capability”304 of floating on water, and thus
satisfying the first prong of the test.
The second phase of the three prong test requires that a structure’s purpose be the
transportation of cargo or people across navigable water. Certainly, aircraft are in
business of commerce, and transport people and things from place to place.305 By
conceding that an aircraft, flying at 30,000 feet over the ocean, is engaged in the
transportation of people and cargo “across” water, one uses the same premise as that
applied by the Supreme Court in their Executive Jet decision when they indicated
that an overseas flight might be considered an activity which is traditionally
maritime in nature.306 Therefore, the second prong of the test has been satisfied.
The third prong of the test requires that a vessel be “in navigation.” In terms of
aviation, this translates into actual flight or preparation for such.307 Thus, the third
prong is met.
As indicated, the three prong test has multiple uses, and can easily be adapted to
a variety of circumstances, including those cases involving helicopters, airplanes and
other unusual, special function watercraft. The test is easy to administer, and should
prove helpful in providing additional guidance for the courts as they continue to
struggle with trying to identify uniform characteristics common to all vessels.
IV. CONCLUSION
One may take the position that very few differences exist amongst the circuits
with regards to their interpretation of the word vessel, and that most opinions
ultimately reach the same conclusion. Others subscribe to the fact that each
jurisdiction has created their own unique “twist” on the issue, and prescribed just
how to address the question. Whichever view is taken, a clear and straightforward
approach would nonetheless benefit all involved.
The use of my three prong test should eliminate some of the ambiguities that
appear to exist, and provide a more consistent result. Every year, it seems, new
kinds of waterborne craft are introduced into the marketplace. Nevertheless, my
three prong test is capable of successfully analyzing situations concerning both the
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See id.; see generally Cesar v. United Tech., 562 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). “The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as means of transportation on
water.” Id.
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14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998). “‘Air commerce’ means interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft
within the limits of any Federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which
directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce.” Id.; “‘Air transportation’ means interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation
or the transportation of mail by aircraft.” Id.
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49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (1998). “‘[A]ircraft’ means any contrivance invented, used, or
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.” Id.
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newest technologies, as well as the most mundane of cases. For those whose
responsibility it is to determine “what is a vessel?” in the surrounds of a judicial
proceeding, the three part test should be a welcome sight on the nautical horizon.
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